"Fur unser Gluck oder das Gluck anderer" Vortrage des X. Intemationalen Leibniz-Kongresses Hannover, 18. 23. Juli 2016 Hel"aLlsgegeben von Wenchao Li itתin Vel"bindllng I ,Ute Beckmann, Sven Erdner, Esther-Maria Err"ulat ona NoreikךJiirgen Herbst, Helena Iwasinski und Sin Band 1 o ~ Georg Olms Verlag YorkןHildesheil11 . Zurich . NeV\ 2016 :tnol111nel1 allSןlschlag wUI'de elוDas Bilti auf delll UI ,1795itz. Chcmnitzןerl' von Leiblוelln FI'eyIןtttried \Villcר()'(!,alןJohann Augtlst Ebel'I ")ilz stil'btןS. 176 und 177 ("LeibIןel19ךX2, z\visclןןNachdl*tlck Hildesheil ngזlLז'V\'eז'echtlicll geschLitzt. Jede Veזז'Das Wel'k ist urhebe gרזlnLIךןזe ZllstiךGI'cnzcn des Urhebel'rechtsgesetzes ist ohlןaul3erhalb der engel ,gcnןdel'e I'UI'VervieltaltigulרsbesolרzLllassig. Das gilt ilןdes \lerlages ul dוel'ung lllןspeiclרLlnd die EilרזLlngeןןUbel'setzungell, Mikroverfill .Systemenךg in clcktronische1וVerarbeittll Die Deutsche Bibliothek vel'zeichnct dicse Publikation Nationalbibliografie; detailliclic bibliogratische Datenךdel' Delltschelרil fbarנb.ddb.de abrlןttp:lldJןtel'11et iibel*IרIIןd inךsil 9706ISO PapierררdigeIךgsbestaIרd ,1lte1'lllרulרןGedJ'l1ckt aLlf saLll'c!j'cicI ,'elו( 31134 HildesheilרtIרg,1 GU1ןg: IIןschlaggeslaltulךךUI bLittelןa NOl'eik, 3X300 WoltelךSatz: Sil110l :gןgelן Hllbc1*t & C(), 37079 G61tilךJerstelltllן YךaIךרtcd in Gel'IןPI'i1 1Sןcilת2016 Vcrl'lg AG, HildeslרGeol'g 01l([~ teך \'o1'behalteIןAlle Recl s.deןןv\vw.oII\ 978-3-487-15428-2ISB Locke and Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity Idan Shimony (Tel Aviv)/Yekutiel Shoham (Tel Aviv) δocke and δeibniz are often classified as proponents of compatibilist theories of human freedom, since both maintain that freedom is consistent with determinism and that the difference between being and not being free turns on how one is determined.1 However, we will argue in this paper that their versions of compatibilism are essentially different and that they have significantly distinct commitments to compatibilism. To this end, we will first analyze the definitions and examples for freedom and necessity that δocke and δeibniz present in sections κ–1γ of chapter β1 of the Essay on Human Understanding and the Nouveaux essais respectively,β and then conjecture how δocke and δeibniz would have continued the discussion, if they had had the opportunity to engage in an exchange of opinions. In this way, we believe, one will be in a position to understand why δeibniz thinks that δocke's discussion of freedom "est un des plus prolixes et des plus subtils de son ouvrage."γ 1 See Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett's introduction to their translation of the Nouveaux essaisμ Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ New Essays on Human Understanding, transl. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge 1λλ6 [hereafter σE], pp. xxii–xxiii. See also Vere Chappellμ "δocke on the Freedom of the Will," inμ Id. (ed.)μ Locke, τxford 1λλκ, pp. κ6–10η, here p. κλ; σicholas Jolleyμ Locke. His Philosophical Thought, τxford 1λλλ, pp. 1βκ–1γ0. β δocke's chapter and δeibniz's corresponding chapter are the longest chapters of the Essay and the Nouveaux essais, respectively. It is thus impossible to provide here a complete account of these chapters. References to δocke's Essay are to book, chapter, and section numbers in John δockeμ An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P. H. σidditch, τxford 1λιη [hereafter E]. γ "δetter to Isaac Jacquelot, βκ. April 1ι0ζ", GP III, ζιγ. In addition to the standard abbreviations for Gerhardt's (GP) and the Academy's (A) editions of δeibniz's texts, we use the following abbreviationsμ AG = Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ Philosophical Essays, ed. and transl. by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis 1λκλ; CJδ = The Correspondence of John Locke, κ vols., ed. by E. S. de Beer, τxford 1λι6–1λκλ; H = Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ Theodicy, transl. by E. ε. Huggard and ed. by Austin Farrer, δondon 1λη1; δ = Id.μ Philosophical Papers and Letters, transl. and ed. by δeroy E. δoemker, Dordrecht β1λ6λ; δA = Id./Antoine Arnauldμ The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. and transl. by H. T. εason, εanchester 1λ6ι; δangley = Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ New Essays concerning Human Understanding, transl. by A. G. δangley, δondon 1κλ6; δC = Id./Simon Clarkeμ The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. by H. G. Alexander, εanchester 1λη6; Pδ = Gottfried Wilhelm δeibnizμ Logical Papers, ed. and transl. by G. H. R. Parkinson, τxford 1λ66; PP = Id.μ Philosophical Writings, ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson, δondon 1λιγ. ηιζ Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham 1. Locke on Freedom and Necessity δocke discusses freedom and necessity in chapter β1 of book β of his Essay, entitled "of power." According to δocke, the idea of power is a simple idea, which we receive from sensation and reflection.ζ δocke opens chapter β1 by explaining how we get this ideaμ we observe patterns of change inside and outside us and conclude that certain things have the possibility or power to generate certain changes in other things.η That which generates change is active power, and that which is capable of receiving change is passive power.6 Corporeal objects mainly give us examples of passive power through their motion, while we experience active power by means of the thinking of our mind.ι σext, δocke claims that will and understanding are active powers of the mind or the agent.κ Will is the power of the agent to choose or determine a preferred course of action.λ The understanding is the power of the agent to think or perceive. δocke does not object to calling will and understanding faculties of the mind, as long as one uses the term properly, that is, as indicating powers of the agent, and not as referring to independent agents working in some kind of autonomy within the mind.10 δocke implies here that only agents are the possessors of powers, so that one power cannot belong to another.11 In ζ E II, ι, κ. η Ibid., β1, 1. 6 Ibid., β. ι Ibid., ζ. Each power has a relation to a certain action and there are only two sorts of actions of which we have ideas, namely, thinking and motion. εotion is related to bodies and, δocke maintains, it is more of a passion than an action. Therefore, corporeal objects provide us with examples of passive power. Thinking is naturally related to the mind and it is through introspection that we see that we can actively initiate movements of our body merely by willing it or thinking about it. Hence, the mind gives us the idea of active power. κ Ibid., η. λ Volition or willing is the actual exercise of the will, namely, a determination of a preferred course of action. An action determined in this way is voluntary, while an action performed without such deliberation is involuntary. 10 Ibid., 6. 11 Cf. Ibid., 16–1λ. δocke and δeibniz on Freedom and σecessity ηιη particular, freedom, as a power, cannot be ascribed to the will itself but only to the agent.1β After remarking briefly that we receive the ideas of freedom and necessity by observing the power in us to begin, avoid, continue, or end actions,1γ δocke turns to define these ideas. "[...] the idea of liberty is [...] the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty, that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be, where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty."1ζ At first sight, the definitions of will and freedom seem so close, that one might wonder why δocke distinguishes them as two separate powers of the mind.1η But there is a difference between them. Will is the power of the agent to prefer or choose a course of action, while freedom is the power of the agent to realize her choices and preferences.16 Will, then, is a necessary condition of freedom, and freedom may be taken as the power of the agent to do what she wills.1ι δocke's definition emphasizes that thinking is another necessary condition of freedom. By thinking δocke seems to mean here reasoning or rational deliberation, by means of which the preference is determined. Hence, thinking is only indirectly a necessary condition of freedomμ it is a necessary condition for willing, which, in turn, is a necessary condition of freedom. The example 1β Ibid., 1ζ. δocke goes from claiming that it is unintelligible and meaningless to ask whether the will is free (ibid.), to argue for determinism of the will (ibid., ββ–βη). τn this point, see Chappellμ "δocke on the Freedom", p. λβ–λ6. 1γ E II, β1, ι. 1ζ Ibid., κ. 1η See D. J. τ'Connorμ John Locke, σew York 1λ6ι, p. 11η. 16 See John Yoltonμ A Locke Dictionary, τxford 1λλγ, p. 1βλ; τ'Connorμ John Locke, p. 11η. 1ι Seeμ "δiberty [...] is the power a εan has to do or forbear doing any particular action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the mind, which is the same thing as to say, according as he himself wills it" (E II, β1, 1η). Jolley elucidates the point as followsμ "Freedom is, roughly, the power to do what we will, and will in turn is the power to choose one course of action over another from the alternatives which are physically possible for us" (Jolleyμ Locke, p. 1βη). ηι6 Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham of the tennis ball1κ confirms this reading. A tennis ball does not think. Consequently, it has no volition and, therefore, it is not a free agent. δocke's subsequent examples stress that thinking and willing are not sufficient for freedom. A man falling from a bridge breaking underneath him certainly thinks that it is better not to fall and prefers or wills not to fall. Yet, he is not free, since it is not in his power to prevent his fall (E β.β1.λ). Consider further the case of a second man, carried in his sleep into a locked room, where a person he is glad to meet is found. He wakes up and enjoys the company. He willingly stays in the room, that is, he prefers staying over leaving the room. His staying is voluntary, yet he is not free, since it is not in his power to leave, if he preferred to do so.1λ "Voluntary then is not opposed to necessary, but to involuntary,"β0 and furthermore, voluntary is not identical to free.β1 These two examples reveal another essential component of freedom according to δocke, namely, being able to do otherwise, or as δocke calls it, the equal ability to perform or avoid an actionββ or indifference of ability.βγ The falling man is not free because he has no choice but to fall. Similarly, the second man may will to stay in the room with his good friend but he too is not free, since he has no choiceμ whether or not he wants to stay, he cannot leave the locked room. The absence of compulsion or restraint, both external and internal, is vital for freedom. To sum up, δocke's definition of freedom contains three essential elementsμ thinking, will, and indifference of ability. Whenever at least one of these elements is missing, there is a state of necessity. A being with no understanding has no will and, therefore, is never free. Such beings are called "necessary agents"βζ. τn the other hand, a rational agent is free if all three conditions of freedom are satisfied and in a state of necessity if not. In particular, a rational agent is under necessity even when she does what she wills, if she is not able to do otherwise, that is, if the third condition of indifference of ability is not satisfied. Finally, understanding, will, and freedom are powers of the agent and thus may be ascribed only to the agent and not to other powers. We 1κ E II, β1, λ. 1λ Ibid., 10. β0 Ibid., 11. β1 The examples discussed above are examples of external actions or "motions of the body". δocke remarks in section 1β that there is complete correspondence between external and mental actions in this context of freedom and necessity. ββ Ibid., κ. βγ Ibid., 10. βζ Ibid., κ; 1γ. δocke and δeibniz on Freedom and σecessity ηιι may say that an agent has an understanding, that she wills something, or that she is free. But it is meaningless to say that freedom thinks, that the understanding wills something, or that the will is free. 2. Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity In his corresponding chapter, δeibniz omits discussions regarding the source of the relevant ideas and turns directly to considering their content. δeibniz has already stated his general disagreement with δocke about the origin and nature of ideas, so there is no point to repeat it here.βη Regarding will,β6 δeibniz does not follow δocke's lead in defining it as the power to set a preference, but rather renders willing or volition as the "effort or endeavor (conatus) to move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad, the endeavor arising immediately out of one's awareness of those things."βι βη In the second book of the Essay δocke argues that our tabula rasa mind receives all its ideas from experience through sensation and reflection. δeibniz has expressed his dissatisfaction concerning this point ever since his first reflections on the Essay from the mid 16λ0s (see "τn δocke's Essay on Human Understanding"; GP V, 1η f. / δangley, 1ζ–16; and "Specimen of Thoughts upon the Second Book"; GP V, βγ / δangley, βγ f. Cf. "δeibniz's review of Pierre Coste's French translation of δocke's Essay"; GP V, γι / δangley, γκ. He elaborates on it in the preface to the Nouveaux Essais; A VI, 6, ζι–ηγ. The crucial point here is that the term "idea" denotes something different for δocke and for δeibniz. δocke conceives it as a mental item actually present in the mind when one perceives and thinks, while for δeibniz it is a prerequisite, as it were, for coherent thinking (see "What is an Idea"; A VI, ζ, 1γι0f. / δ, β0ι f.; "εeditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas", A VI, ζ, ηκκ ff. / δ, βλβ f.). Accordingly, δeibniz asserts at the beginning of book βμ "In order to keep away from an argument upon which we have already spent too long, let me say in advance, sir, that when you say that ideas come from one or other of those causes [i.e. sensation or reflection], I shall take that to mean the actual perception of the ideas; for I believe I have shown that in so far as they contain something distinct they are in us before we are aware of them" (σE II, 1, β). β6 We omit here δeibniz's reply concerning the idea of power, since it is less relevant to the general line of argument. In brief, δeibniz regards power as possibility of change, distinguishes between active and passive power, and agrees with δocke that the mind gives us the clearest idea of active power while matter provides examples of passive power (σE II, β1, 1–ζ). βι Ibid., η. ηικ Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham Both our inner and outer actions follow from this endeavor, as long as it is not hindered. δeibniz contrasts volition with appetition. The latter is an effort or endeavor arising from insensible perceptions, of which we are unaware.βκ Voluntary, by contrast, may be ascribed only to "actions one can be aware of and can reflect upon when they arise from some consideration of good and bad."βλ Finally, understanding is not merely the power to perceive, but rather a power to actually understand what we perceive, form distinct idea of it, and reflect on it.γ0 In response to δocke's definition of freedom, δeibniz presents a series of distinctions.γ1 Freedom is either freedom in law or in fact. The examples of cases of freedom in law imply that this type of freedom is a right granted to human beings in social and political contexts. Freedom in fact refers to the state or ability of the person herself, irrespective of the political context.γβ Freedom in fact is further distinguished into freedom to act (i.e. freedom to do what one wills) and freedom to will (i.e. the power to will as one should).γγ δeibniz classifies δocke's freedom as a freedom of action. He remarks briefly that a person is free in this sense if she has the required means and suitable control over her body. βκ δeibniz adds that there are appetitions of which we can be aware, but does not elaborate on this point. The notion of "minute perceptions", namely insensible perceptions of which we are unaware, stems from the principle of continuity. If one's mind could be said to be without perceptions during dreamless sleep, and then all of a sudden in possession of perceptions as one wakes up, the principle of continuity would be violated. Hence, one must concede that "noticeable perceptions arise by degrees from ones which are too minute to be noticed" (σE, "Preface"; A VI, 6, ηγ–ηι). βλ σE II, β1, η. γ0 The difference between δocke and δeibniz on this point corresponds to their different conceptions of what idea is (see note 11 above). γ1 σE II, β1, κ. See Appendix 1 below. γβ If we think of freedom in law in terms of social or political right, than freedom in fact may be taken as natural right. γγ δeibniz agrees with δocke that one cannot properly speak of freedom of will, since freedom may be attributed to agents and not to the agent's powers or faculties. Thus, the customary phrase "freedom of will" has to be understood as meaning "freedom of the agent to will", and when asking whether the will is free "the intention is to ask whether a man is free when he wills" (ibid., 1ζ). In general, δeibniz concurs that it is inappropriate to regard the faculties of the mind as active agents in themselves (ibid., 6). δocke and δeibniz on Freedom and σecessity ηιλ δeibniz seems more interested in the second type of freedom in fact, namely, freedom to will or the power to will as one should. This type is further distinguished into two subtypes. The one is contrasted with the imperfection of the mind and pertains to the understanding. It involves the ability to restrain the influence of the passions on the will by means of the understanding. The second is contrasted with necessity and pertains to the willμ "[...] it consists in the view that the strongest reasons or impressions which the understanding presents to the will do not prevent the act of the will from being contingent, and do not confer upon it an absolute or (so to speak) metaphysical necessity. It is in this sense that I always say that the understanding can determine the will, in accordance with which perceptions and reasons prevail, in a manner which, although it is certain and infallible, inclines without necessitating."γζ This type of freedom consists in determining the will through the understanding and contains three essential componentsμ spontaneity, intelligence or rational deliberation, and contingency. Spontaneity means self-determination. A free agent consciously determines her will and actively influences her course of action. Second, δeibniz agrees with δocke that intelligence is a necessary condition of freedom and maintains that a free agent determines her will by means of her understanding.γη Finally, δeibniz contends that determining the will by reasons provided by the understanding does not undermine freedom, since it involves contingency rather than necessity. The notions of "contingency" and "incline without necessitating" require further explication. σecessary is something the opposite of which is logically impossible, and contingent is something the opposite of which is logically possible.γ6 δocke defines necessity as lack of freedom. Hence, for example, on δocke's account the motion of a tennis ball is necessary, since it is not γζ Ibid., κ. γη Seeμ "Aristotle has rightly noted that we are not prepared to call an action "free" unless as well as being spontaneous [spontanées] it is also deliberate [deliberées]" (ibid., λ). Remnant and Bennett translate here "unconstrained" rather than "spontaneous", which seems more suitable to the immediate context (discussing the unconstrained motion of a tennis ball). δangley, on the other hand, retains the word "spontaneous", which fits better with the broader context of δeibniz's discussion of freedom. γ6 Seeμ "A truth is necessary when its opposite implies contradiction; and when it is not necessary, it is called contingent" ("δetter to Coste, 1λ December 1ι0ι"; GP III, ζ00 / AG, 1λγ); "[...] event whose opposite is possible is contingent, event as that whose opposite is impossible ηκ0 Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham free. For δeibniz, on the other hand, although the motion of the tennis ball is not free, it is not necessary but rather contingent. That the ball moves in a certain way is not a logically necessary truth. It is rather a truth that depends on certain circumstances and the laws of nature in force. Thus, the motion of the tennis ball involves merely conditional or hypothetical necessityμ if the laws of nature were different, it would move in a different manner. Therefore, the opposite case (i.e. other motion) is possible and not contradictory. In the case of a free rational agent, the fact that she determines her will through her understanding does not eliminate her freedom, since the determination does not involve absolute or logical necessity.γι This is so, since the inclination of the will toward a certain option does not cancel the other options, that is, the alternative options do not become contradictory but remain possible. A wise agent choosing an optimal course of action on the basis of intelligent grounds provided by the understanding is not under necessity, since although not chosen, inferior alternative ways are still logically possible and are not cancelled by the choice. "But good, either true or apparent – in a word, the motive – inclines without necessitating, that is, without imposing an absolute necessity. For when God is necessary" ("Theodicy", § βκβ; GP VI, βκζ / H, βλλ); "[...] we must distinguish between an absolute and a hypothetical necessity. We must also distinguish between a necessity which takes place because the opposite implies a contradiction (which necessity is called logical, metaphysical, or mathematical) and a necessity which is moral, whereby a wise being chooses the best, and every mind follows the strongest inclination" ("δeibniz's ηth δetter to Clarke", § ζ; δC, η6). γι Rational agents do not, of course, always act freely. Their will is not determined merely by reasons, but also by dispositions, passions, habits, beliefs, and external impressions ("ηth δetter to Clarke", § 1η / δC, ηλ. "δetter on Freedom"; PP, 11γ). They are free to the extent that they take into consideration all these types of motives in order to actively determine their will in a certain way. Willing as one should means being able to satisfactorily take into consideration or weigh all relevant motives. In so far as the will is passively determined by passions and impressions, the agent's action is not free. To this δeibniz refers when he talks about freedom to will as contrasted with the imperfection of the mind (σE II, β1, κ). τn δeibniz's image of weighing motives on the scales of the balance of reason, see εarcelo Dascalμ "The Balance of Reason", inμ Daniel Vanderveken (ed.)μ Logic, Thought and Action, Dordrecht β00η, pp. βι–ζι. Charlie Dunbar Broadμ Leibniz. An Introduction, δondon 1λιη, p. γ0) maintains that "incline without necessitating" means that the reasons do not demonstratively entail the conclusion, but merely give it a probability greater than one-half. δocke and δeibniz on Freedom and σecessity ηκ1 (for instance) chooses the best, what he does not choose, and is inferior in perfection, is nevertheless possible. But if what he chooses was absolutely necessary, any other way would be impossible, which is against the hypothesis. For God chooses among possibles, that is, among many ways none of which implies a contradiction."γκ The distinction between necessary and contingent is crucial for δeibniz, since it is what makes place for freedom in his system. According to δeibniz's principle of sufficient reason, there is no indifference and everything in the world is determined. So if determined meant necessary, there could be no freedom. Thus, he distinguishes between being necessarily determined and being contingently determined. "[...] determination should not be confused with necessityμ there is just as much connection or determination amongst thoughts as amongst motions (since being determined is not at all the same as being forced or pushed in a constraining way)[...] If by 'necessity' we understood a man's being inevitably determined, as could be foreseen by a perfect εind provided with a complete knowledge of everything going on outside and inside that man, then, since thoughts are as determined as the movements which they represent, it is certain that every free act would be necessary; but we must distinguish what is necessary from what is contingent though determined. σot only are contingent truths not necessary, but the links between them are not always absolutely necessary either; for it must be admitted that when one thing follows from another in the contingent realm, the kind of determining that is involved is not the same as when one thing follows from another in the realm of the necessary. Geometrical and metaphysical 'followings' necessitate, but physical and moral ones incline without necessitating. There is even a moral and voluntary element in what is physical, through its relation to God, since the laws of motion are necessitated only by what is best. God chooses freely, even though he is determined to choose the best. But since bodies do not choose for themselves, God having chosen for them, they have come to be called 'necessary agents' in common usage. I have no objection to this, provided that no one confounds the necessary with the determined and goes on to suppose that free beings act in an undetermined way – an error which has prevailed in certain minds, and destroys the most important truths, even the fundamental axiom that nothing happens without reason."γλ γκ "ηth δetter to Clarke", § κ; δC, ηι. γλ σE II, β1, 1γ. ηκβ Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham To sum up, unlike δocke, who emphasizes freedom of action, δeibniz is interested in freedom to will (i.e. the ability to will as one should), and in particular, in freedom to will as contrasted with necessity. This type of freedom involves three essential componentsμ spontaneity, rational deliberation, and contingency. The latter is in particular vital for δeibniz, since he allows no indifference and, therefore, must admit a type of determination which is not necessary.ζ0 3. A Hypothetical Continuation of the Discussion A hypothetical continuation of the discussion between δocke and δeibniz on freedom and necessity may facilitate a deeper understanding of their positions and differences. τf course, the subject is rich with intricate ideas and subtleties, and discussing them here in full detail is impossible. We will thus focus merely on the determination of the will by the understanding and the ability to do otherwise. First, it appears that δocke and δeibniz would have acknowledged rather quickly their different emphases. δocke is interested in a type of freedom which can ground moral responsibility and just divine providence, so he emphasizes freedom to act or the ability to do otherwise.ζ1 δeibniz does not disagree but simply thinks that it is a brute fact or an "axiom" that when an agent wills something and is not hindered, she will act accordingly.ζβ Hence he thinks that the problem of willing as one should is more significant to understanding freedom. ζ0 Seeμ "I have shown that freedom [...] consists in intelligence, which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we determine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom, and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is self-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the understanding, which inclines it without compelling itμ and all the conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words" ("Theodicy", § βκκ; GP VI, βκκ / H, γ0γ). ζ1 See e.g. E IV, 1ι, ζ. ζβ σE II, β1, η. δocke and δeibniz on Freedom and σecessity ηκγ In this regard too, δocke and δeibniz may seem to agree, at least initially. For whereas δocke stresses indifference of ability, he rejects indifference of will and maintains, in a similar manner to δeibniz, that "'tis as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring should be determined by Good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will, and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection. σay, were we determined by anything but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free, the very end of our freedom being, that we might attain the good we choose. And therefore every man is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to doμ else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty."ζγ To this Theophilus concisely replies on δeibniz's behalf that "σothing could be more true; those who seek some other kind of freedom do not know what they are asking for."ζζ It is this agreement which led scholars to conclude that δocke and δeibniz share a compatibilist view regarding freedom. But again, conjecturing how a discussion between the two would have proceeded may draw our attention to substantial differences between their compatibilist positions. We may assume that their discussion would not have stopped at this point of agreement, but continued to the fundamental principles underlying the idea of the determination of the will. δeibniz's answer is straightforward. As quoted above, the determination of the will follows from and genuine indifference is ruled out by δeibniz's principle of sufficient reason. δeibniz concedes that in a certain sense freedom may be said to involve indifference. But this indifference merely means the exclusion of logical and physical necessity. That is, it consists in (1) contingency or choice between logically possible alternatives and in (β) the fact that an agent is not necessitated by physical (and psychological) laws to choose one way or another (unlike, e.g., heavy things which are bound by physical ζγ E II, β1, ζκ. ζζ σE II, β1, ζκ. ηκζ Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham laws to tend downward). In this restricted sense, freedom may be said to include indifference of ability.ζη But freedom does not involve indifference of equilibrium, namely, an indifference according to which the agent equally inclines toward competing alternatives. σor does it include some sort of "indifferentistic power" to determine oneself to act without grounds or even against all grounds.ζ6 δocke, on the other hand, seems to lack a metaphysical underpinning of the determination of the will by the understanding. Perhaps it is this deficiency that accounts for his claim in §ζι that one can suspend judgment, namely, suspend the determination of the will toward a certain end, which is contrary to his general view that an agent is never free not to will one way or another.ζι This may also explain δocke's concession to Philippus van δimborch, who challenged δocke's view regarding the determination of the will. If δocke and δeibniz had engaged in exchange of ideas on the matter, δeibniz would have probably drawn δocke's attention to the inconsistency in § ζιζκ and may have been instrumental in facing van δimborch's challenge. Van δimborch writes to δocke that indifference is necessary for freedomμ "σow my opinion is that when a man acts in accordance with right reason he always wills what his understanding judges ought to be done; nevertheless he can also act against reason and determine his will to the contrary; more than thatμ before his understanding, after a careful examination of the reasons, has judged what ought to be done he can by brute impulse do, not what is in accordance with reason, but what carnal desire dictates. If a man does not have liberty ζη See David Blumenfeldμ "Freedom, Contingency, and Things Possible in Themselve", inμ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ζλ/1 (1λκκ), p. κ1–101, here κβ–κγ. ζ6 See "Discourse on εetaphysics", § γ0; A VI, ζ, 1ηιη / δ, γβ1 f.; "δetter to Arnauld, 1ζ July 16κ6"; A II, β, κ0 / δ, γγι; "σecessary and Contingent Truths"; A VI, ζ, 1ηβ0–1ηβ1 / PP, 101 f.; "δetter on Freedom", PP, 11γ f.; "τn the Radical τrigination of Things", GP, VII γ0ζ; δ, ζκκ; σE, II, β1, βη; γ6; ζι; "δetter to Coste, 1λ December 1ι0ι", GP III, ζ01 f.; AG, 1λζ f.; "Theodicy", § ζ6; GP VI, 1βκ / H, 1ζκ f.; "δeibniz's ηth δetter to Clarke", §§16–1ι; δC, ηλ f. ζι See E II, β1, βγ. ζκ δeibniz probably would have also questioned δocke's comment in E IV, γ, βλ to the effect that the laws of nature are to be ascribed to "the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise architect," which implies that God's freedom does involve indifference of will. δocke and δeibniz on Freedom and σecessity ηκη herein to determine himself or not to determine himself, and to suspend his action, I cannot see in what liberty consists."ζλ In the beginning of the correspondence δocke stands his ground. He rejects van δimborch's claim and maintains that "δiberty in no wise consists in the indifferency of a man, but only in the power to act or not to act according as we will."η0 But in his subsequent letter van δimborch persists and explains that indifference does not mean that an agent is equally inclined toward different alternatives, for such equilibrium, especially with regard to moral actions, does not exist. It rather means that despite an inclination to one side, an agent can determine herself to the other, and this demonstrates her "dominion" over her actions and hence her freedom.η1 Van δimborch argues that δocke's definition of freedom is too narrow, since it refers only to action but not to willing.ηβ In a way, van δimborch stresses a similar point to that raised by δeibnizμ that action must not be hindered is rather trivial; more important is the role of willing in free actions. δocke appears to eventually come round to van δimborch's positionμηγ "[...] in my opinion a man is free in every action, as well of willing as of understanding, if he was able to have abstained from that action of willing or understanding; if not, not. εore particularly, as regards the willμ there are some cases in which a man is unable not to will, and in all those acts of willing a man is not free because he is unable not to act. In the rest, where he was able to will or not to will, he is free."ηζ ζλ "κ July 1ι01", CJδ VII, γ6λ f. See also from the same letterμ "Indifferency is that energy of the spirit by which, when all requisites for acting are present, it can act or not act" (ibid., γ6ι). Cf. "δetter of γ τctober 1ι01", ibid., ζηγ. η0 "1β August 1ι01", ibid., ζ0λ; cf. "δetter of β1 εay 1ι01", ibid., γβκ f. η1 "γ τctober 1ι01", ibid., ζηη. ηβ Ibid., ζηκ f. ηγ Chappell ("δocke on the Freedom of the Will," p. 10β f.) takes it as evidence that the addition to §η6 in the postmortem fifth edition of the Essay is a consequence of δocke's correspondence with van δimborch. The addition readsμ "But yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in respect of willing, and that is the choosing of a remote good as an end to be pursued" (E II, β1, η6). It is in clear contrast with what δocke originally wroteμ "A man in respect of that act of willing, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free" (ibid., βγ) Pierre Coste informed δeibniz on the correspondence between δocke and van δimborch and the resulting additions and corrections to the Essay (see "δeibniz's letter to Coste, 1λ December 1ι0ι"; GP III, ζ00 / AG, 1λγ). ηζ "βκ September 1ι0β", CJδ VII, 6κ0. ηκ6 Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham Again, had δocke and δeibniz engaged in actual exchange of ideas, the outcome of the correspondence with van δimborch might have been different. τn the other hand, although δeibniz's metaphysical ideas might have been instrumental to ward off van δimborch's challenge, δocke would have probably enquired whether they allow a form of compatibilism which involves a genuine ability to do otherwise. For even if freedom of action is somewhat trivial as δeibniz appears to suggest, it is still, for δocke, a crucial requirement for freedom. In this regard, δocke would have been particularly concerned with δeibniz's analytic theory of truth and complete concept theory of individual substances. The problem is that these theories seem to eliminate contingency and hence undermine freedomμ they suggest that in true propositions the predicate inheres in the subject, and this, in turn, appears to entail that all true propositions are necessary, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject without contradiction. δeibniz is clearly aware of the difficulties posed by these theories to his account of freedom.ηη His response, in brief, is that in necessary and contingent truths the predicate inheres in the subject in different manners.η6 Inherence generally means that "the concept of the predicate is in some way involved in the concept of the subject" or that there is "some connection between subject and predicate."ηι In necessary truths, it means that the predicate is actually contained in the content of the subject. Thus, an analysis of the terms of a necessary truth will yield identical propositions, that is to say, propositions displaying the (partial) identity between the subject and the predicate.ηκ In contingent truths, the predicate is not literally contained in the subject. Rather, the content of the subject ηη See "τn Freedom"; A VI, ζ, 16ηζ / δ, β6γ f.; "Discourse on εetaphysics", §1γ; A VI, ζ, 1ηζ6. η6 See "First Truths"; A VI, ζ, 16ζζ f. / δ, β6ι f. ηι "τn Freedom"; A VI, ζ, 16ηζ / δ, β6ζ; "τn Contingency"; A VI, ζ, 16η0 / AG, βκ. Italics added. See also "Remarks on Arnauld's δetter"; A II, β, ζλ / δA, ζι; "δetter to Arnauld, 1ζ. July 16κ6"; A II, β, ιη, κ0 / δ, γγζ; γγι. ηκ See for example "General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and of Truths" § 60; A VI, ζ, ιι6 / Pδ, 61; "General Inquiries", § 1γγ; A VI, ζ, ιι6 / Pδ, ιι; "σecessary and Contingent Truths"; A VI, ζ, 1η1η f. / PP, λ6 f.; "τn Contingency"; A VI, ζ, 16ζλ f. / AG, βκ; "τn Freedom"; A VI, ζ, 16ηη f. / δ, β6ζ f. The following are examples of analyses of necessary truths, resulting in identity propositions. An analysis of the proposition "a triangle is a polygon" δocke and δeibniz on Freedom and σecessity ηκι somehow implies that the predicate is appropriately attributed to the subject.ηλ Therefore, an analysis of the terms of a contingent truth cannot yield identical propositions. Such an analysis will result instead in "convergence", as it were, to the conclusion that the predicate pertains to the subject, in a similar manner to convergence of the series 1, 1⁄2, 1⁄3, 1⁄4 ... to 0, without 0 being included in the series.60 Whether δeibniz's clarification can satisfy δocke's requirement for substantial meaning of ability to do otherwise remains an open question. Admittedly, the issue is much more complex than this brief answer on δeibniz's behalf reveals. In particular, we did not go into the details of the complete concept theory of individual substances, which apart from its metaphysical eccentricity, seems to pose the gravest difficulties to the ability to do otherwise.61 4. Conclusion In this paper we discussed δocke's and δeibniz's views regarding freedom and necessity and tried to conjecture how an actual discourse between them would have evolved. Indeed, a discussion between the two thinkers on these issues probably would have unfolded in diverse ways, not explored in this paper. σevertheless, the important point here is that examining δocke's view will result in the identical proposition "a three-sided polygon is a polygon." An analysis of the proposition "John's mother is a woman" will result in the identical proposition "the woman who gave birth to John is a woman." ηλ δeibniz illustrates the point by means of the example of Alexander the Great. By analyzing the concept of Alexander in order to establish contingent propositions regarding Alexander (e.g. that he will conquer Darius and Porus), one does not find in it the relevant predicates themselves (i.e. "conquering Darius and Porus"), but rather "the basis and the reason for all the predicates which can truly be affirmed of it" ("Discourse on εetaphysics", § κ; A VI, ζ, 1ηζ0 f. / δ, γ0ι f.). See alsoμ "I mean no other link between subject and predicate than the one existing in the most contingent truths, namely that there is always something to be conceived in the subject which serves to explain why this predicate or event pertains to it, or why this has happened rather than not" ("Remarks on Arnauld's δetter"; A II, β, ηβ / δA, η0). 60 Seeμ "A true contingent proposition cannot be reduced to identical propositions, but is proved by showing that if the analysis is continued further and further, it constantly approaches identical propositions, but never reaches them" ("General Inquiries", § 1γζ, A VI, ζ, ιι6 / Pδ, ιι, italics added). τnly God, being able to grasp the infinite, can see the convergence and know contingent truths with certainty. 61 See δois Frankelμ "Being Able to do τtherwiseμ δeibniz on Freedom and Contingency," inμ Roger S. Woolhouse (ed.)μ Leibniz. Critical Assessments, vol. IV, δondon 1λλζ, pp. βκζ–γ0β. ηκκ Idan Shimony/Yekutiel Shoham vis-à-vis δeibniz's and conjecturing a hypothetical continuation of their discussion propose a deeper understanding of their positions and differences. Both share compatibilist view of freedom. Yet their definitions of freedom and their emphases are different. They also differ in their commitments to compatibilism. δocke did not hesitate to modify his view, when challenges suggested that it might undermine moral responsibility. δeibniz, by contrast, adhered to his compatibilism, since it was entrenched in deeper metaphysical doctrines. Appendix: Leibniz's Classification of Aspects of Freedom freedom to will contrasted with the imperfection of the mind freedom to will contrasted with necessity freedom to act freedom to will freedom in fact freedom in law Freedom